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PIN Security

Why Birthdays and Keypad Patterns Make Weak PINs

November 3, 2026 · 5 min read

A birthday or a keypad shape is a weak PIN because other people choose the same kinds of codes. An attacker who can try likely choices does not have to walk through every possible PIN.

Studies of user-chosen PINs find recurring choices: dates, repeated digits, and familiar movements across a keypad. These habits help an attacker decide which codes to try first. The best guessing order varies with the people being targeted and what the attacker knows about them.

Dates

People turn dates into four or six digits: a day and month, a year, or a birthday written as DDMM, MMDD, or YYYY. The examples 0311, 2512, and 1998 are illustrations of that habit. Do not use them, and do not use your own dates either.

A date is easy to learn from a social profile, a card application, or a conversation. It is also a small set compared with every four-digit combination. There are 10,000 four-digit PINs if leading zeros and repeats are allowed, and far fewer calendar dates that people actually pick.

Two extra random digits: 100 times as many possibilities

4 random digits

10,000

possible PINs · 104

×100

6 random digits

1,000,000

possible PINs · 106

Counts assume every digit 0–9 is allowed in every position, including leading zeros and repeats. They describe uniformly random PINs—not the guessability of birthdays or patterns. Retry limits are a separate protection.

Repeated digits and straight sequences

Repeated digits such as 0000 and 1111, and sequences such as 1234 and 9876, are easy to remember and easy to try early. Four digits still allow 10,000 combinations, but people tend to cluster around a much smaller set of familiar choices. That gives an attacker a useful shortcut.

Shapes on the keypad

A keypad makes some codes feel like a picture. On a common phone layout, 2580 runs down the middle column. 159 follows a diagonal, while 1379 selects the four corners. Other choices trace a square or a short connected path. People remember the motion, so they choose it again.

The row order changes between layouts. A phone keypad puts 1–2–3 at the top and 7–8–9 at the bottom. A computer numeric keypad reverses those rows: 7–8–9 at the top, 1–2–3 at the bottom. The 4–5–6 row stays in the middle.

This matters when you remember a movement rather than the digits. Moving down the middle of the three main rows gives 2 → 5 → 8 on a phone, but 8 → 5 → 2 on a computer keypad. Keeping the digits 258 instead makes your finger travel upward on the computer layout. Switch layouts in the example below to see how the same code changes direction.

Follow the digits, see the shape

2 → 5 → 8 → 0 runs straight down the middle of a phone keypad.

The orange line follows the digits in order. These published examples illustrate shapes; do not use them as your PIN.

A few attempts is not the same as uninterrupted guessing

Many phones, cards, and apps allow only a few wrong tries, then they wait, lock, or demand a recovery step. Apple’s platform security guide describes longer delays after failed passcode attempts. While that limit holds, an attacker cannot test thousands of PINs at the lock screen.

Offline guessing is a different situation. If an attacker obtains a hash or encrypted file that can be tested independently, the app’s login retry limit may no longer apply. Each guess can still be slowed by the way the data is protected. A stolen phone is not automatically an unrestricted offline target: hardware protections can keep guesses tied to the device.

A useful “time to guess” estimate must state the situation and the assumed guess rate. The cost depends on both the PIN and the system protecting it; the number of combinations alone does not tell you how long an attack will take.

What to do instead

When the device allows it, generate a random PIN and keep digits you did not choose, including a leading zero. If the device rejects that code, generate another one. Do not “fix” it into a date or a shape.

The PIN checker flags possible dates, repeats, sequences, and keypad shapes. A random code can resemble a pattern by chance, and an unflagged code is not proof of randomness. Treat the result as a prompt to review your choice; the checker cannot know how you chose it or your device’s retry limits.

Use a different PIN for the phone, the bank card, and other devices. A code someone sees over your shoulder is already known. A retry limit does not help after the correct PIN has been observed.

Related PIN guides

Pick a PIN that is not a pattern

Generate a random code, or check one you are considering. Do not enter a PIN you currently use on a device you do not control.

Photo by Marc Marchal on Unsplash · Modified with AI